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ote q o r t s on the Advisory
Committed c
u
m work on the clms
actiorr rule, Civil Rule 23. The m-ng
process has becme the Wrt
attention in *cent yams, mul it
is hoped that this npoh will stimlute
additional interest aful rrrpnrta.
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A
l?Dilpoint
Report

T h is a midpoint progress report of
the Reporter on current prop& to
amend the class action rule, Rule 23 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In
part, it is one of many calls for help.
The proposed amendments have been
published for comment. It is important
that the rulemakers hear from as many
interested observers as possible. One of
the pitfalls of the comment process -at
least one of the pitfalls that the
rulemakers like to believe in -is that
there are many observers who believe
that the rulemakers have got it right, and
do not need to be told that they have got
it right. The record of comments may
make proposals seem more controversial,
or less well advised, than they are. And in
other part, this report is an illustrati06of
the care that is taken in the largely
invisible process that continually reviews,
and periodically amends, the rules.
The rulemaking process is wily
sketched from the bottom up. The
process begins in the committee structure
of the Judicial Conference of the United

States. First-line responsibility falk on
the Advisory Committee on the Federal '
Rules of Civil Procedure. The Advisory
Committee reports to the "Sta&ng2'
Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure. Amendments tentatively, ,
endorsed by the Standmg C o d t t e e
am published for comment and public
hearings. After publication, the Advisory
Committee reviews all of the written
comments and oral testiinony and again
reports to the Standrig Committee. If
substantial changeshave been made, a
proposal may require a second period of
publication and public comment. When
a proposal is ready to proceed funher,
the Standing Committee recommends
approval by the Judicial Conference, a
group of more than two dozen federal
judges chaired by the Chief Justice. If
the Judicial Conference approves, it
transmits the proposal to the Supreme
Court. The Supreme Court bears
ultimate responsibility for adopting the
rules and revising them. Once the
Supreme Court has approved a revision,
it sends the revision to Congress.
Revisions adopted by the Supreme
Court become effective unless Congress
acts to disapprove them.
Rule 23 was extensively amended in
1966. The amendments created a new
"common question" class action under
RuIe 23(b)(3). (b)(3) class actions were
designed to facilitate enforcement of
claims too small to bear the cost of
inhvidual litigation. This new
device has taken on a role far beyond
the dreams of its creators, enhancing the
actual effect of many substantive
provisions. In the last few years, it has
been pressed to serve in quite a different
setting as one of the many alternative
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strategies used m the effor~to manage
vast numbers of related actlons Asbesios
lliigation promdes the most famlliar
example, but other examples are almost
as famillar Attempts to w n class
certification have met w t h m ~ e success
d
m dealing wlth such problems as sllicone
gel breast ~mplants,agarettes, sidesaddle
pickup trucks, and heart valves
The dramatic growth of (b)(3) class
actions generated lively debate For more
than two decades, however, a taut
moratorium on Rule 23 proposals was
observed by the Clml Rules Advlsory
Commlttee The process of shaplng
Rule 23 into a worklng and reasonably
famillar procedure was left to the creatlve
efforts of the bar and the wsdom of the
bench In 1991, however, the report of an
ad hoc Judlclal Conference committee on
asbestos litlgat~onled the Judlc~al
Conference to recommend that the
Standlng Commlttee and Advlsory
Commlttee study Rule 23 The Advlsory
Committee has been working on this
chore ever since
The first effort of the Admsory
Committee was based m large part on
proposals made by an Amencan Bar
Association committee several years ago
As refined by the Admsory Committee,
then chaired by Chlef Judge Sam C
Pointer, Jr , of the Northern Distnct of
Alabama, this draft would have made
many changes None of the changes was
fundamental, and even together they
.\vouldnot have been revolutionary
Rule 23 would have been restructured
This proposal softened the long-familiar
categoncal distinctions between
mconsistent-obligation and limited-fund
(b)(l), injunction (b)(2), and "common
question" (b)(3) classes The softening
was designed in large part to senre other
goals, strengthening notlce requirements
lor some actlons but reducing them for
others, expanding but also contracting
opportunltles to opt out, creatlng new
opt-m classes, and so on These proposals
were remewed by extenswe groups of
academics, lawyers, and judges There
was wdespread agreemenL that they were
relatlveiy modest But the lawyers m

particular were concerned that the main
effect would be to create at least a decade
of uncertainty while they collectively
worked to instruct judges on proper use
of the new rule.
The questions raised by these reactions
suggested to the Advisory Committee that
it must undertake a broader inquiry The
central question was whether the time
had come to propose any amendments
whatever. Faced with a lack of helpful
empirical data, the Advisory Committee
enlisted the help of the researchers at the
Federal Judicial Center (FJC). The FJC
study set out to address a series of
questions raised by widespread anecdotal
observations about class actions by
reviewing the files of all class actions
concluded during a two-year period in
four of the busiest class-action districts.
The first lesson was that class actions
have been dramatically undercounted.
Each of the four districts had at least
twice as many class-action filings as had
been reported. Other lessons were more
complex, and always subject to the
qualifications that attach to any study
based on a sample, even one carefully
chosen. The Advisory Committee now chaired by Judge Patrick E.
Higgnbotham of the Fifth Circuit - also
reached out for the views of academics,
lawyers, and judges with rich personal
experience in class litigation. Lawyers
were invited to address the Advisory
Committee at its regular meetings. The
Committee met in conjunction with, or
attended, class-action symposia at law
schools in Dallas, New York, Philadelpha,
and Tuscaloosa. Experienced class-action
practitioners also were invited to attend
committee meetings, and contributed
valuable suggestions. Two veterans of the
1966 amendment process, John P Frank
of the PhoenLx Bar and Professor Arthur
R. Miller of Harvard Law School, were
actively involved in these efforts.
With all of these activities, the
Advisory Con~n~ittee
moved to the top of
several hlls (none was really a mountain).
It stayed on some, and moved back down
from others. It has won Standing
Committee approval to publish several
amendments for public comment in the
form submitted to the Standing
Committee. The Standing Committee
made it clear, however, that it was
approving publication as the next logical

step in a process that still must include
careful reconsideration of each item in
the proposal.
So what is proposed, and what
earnestly considered proposals were put
aside?
One proposal would create a
permissive interlocutory procedure that
would establish court of appeals
discretion to permit appeal from an order
granting or refusing class certification.
Both judges and lawyers commonly greet
this proposal with ~Izepticism,fearing that
bootless attempts to appeal will be made
in virtually every class action. And, just as
commonly, they have come to agree that
the courts of appeals should be able to
manage this procedure as an improvement on the unsatisfactory alternatives
now available. Appellate judges in
particular believe that experience with the
similar permissive appeal provisions of
28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) shows that the new
appeal procedure can be controlled with
little burden or delay
The other proposals that should
command general interest focus on (b)(3)
common-question classes. Changes are
made in the list of enumerated factors
that bear on the determination whether
common questions "predominate" and
whether a (b)(3) class is superior to other
means of adjudication. These changes
focus on both ends of the spectrum
defined by the size of individual classmember claims. In a variety of ways, the
factors are revised to encourage care in
certifying classes that include many
members whose claims would support
individual litigation. Although class
certification of mass tort cases is not
prohibited, these changes reflect concern
that in some situations class actions are
less desirable than individual litigation or
aggregation by some means other than a
single large class.
At the other end of the spectrum lie
claims that promise to retuln only
minuscule recoveries to individual class
members. A new factor (F) would be
added, permitting the court to consider
"whether the probable relief to individual
class members justifies the costs and
burdens of class litigation." This provision
has become know11 in the vernacular as
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the "just ain't worth it" provision. It is
bound to be controversial. To some, it
will seem a retreat from the great strides
made by (b)(3) toward enforcing
important social policies that are
imperfectly fulfilled by public enforcement.
The point of class actions, on this view, is
not only to secure individual redress but
also to take the profit out of violating the
law. The proposal takes a rather different
view, founded in the belief that private
litigation is an imperfect means of
enforcing public values. Adversary
litigation as we know it is cumbersome
and expensive. Often it is called upon to
enforce the uncertain commands of
obscure statutory or other policies that
may be violated despite diligent and
sincere efforts to comply The costs and
risks of this enforcement are justified by
the prospect of meaningful individual
relief. If there is no prospect of
meaningful individual relief, and no one
but the class lawyers stands to benefit,
the costs and burdens of class litigation
may not be justified.
(An attractive alternative to refusal to
certify a class may be to provide for relief
that need not incur the frequently
crippling expenses of administering
individual distribution. "Fluid" class
recovery may provide attractive means of
substitute relief. Rather than distribute a
dollar of damages to each individual
consumer injured by a short-lived
pricefixing conspiracy, the defendants
could be ordered to reduce prices as a
way of compensating present consumers
without bothering to address the
discontinuities between past and present
consumers. The Advisory Committee
concluded that such alternatives should
be put aside because they raise serious
questions under the Rules Enabling Act
requirement that the rules not abridge,
modify, or enlarge any substantive right.)
Another new item in the list of (b)(3)
factors is the "maturity" of the class claim,
issue, or defense. This factor addresses

glaring gaps in factual knowledge. Claims
that a product causes an injury, for
example, may rest on very uncertain
science. Experience with individual
litigation of related issues may show that
courts regularly reach inconsistent results.
In either setting, it may be unwise to risk
all claims on a single throw of the class
action die.
A final important (b)(3) provision is
proposed by adding a new paragraph
(b)(4). T h s proposal would permit
certification of a (b)(3) class for purposes
of settlement only, even though the court
would not certify the same class for
litigation purposes. Settlement classes
have evolved gradually over the years,
but recent Third Circuit decisions have
adopted the limit that a class may be
certified for settlement purposes only if
the same class would be certified for
litigation. The proposal draws from the
belief that settlement classes may prove
useful in addressing a variety of problems
that cannot be resolved by litigation
classes. Choice-of-law problems offer one
clear example. Application of different
state laws to dispersed events may defeat
class-based litigation of some claims
because common questions no longer
predominate. Settlements can be achieved
that bypass these problems, and that
provide the additional advantage of
achieving similar treatment for people
suffering similar injuries. Manageability
problems offer another example. A single
court may be hard-pressed to resolve
litigation that embraces not only common
class issues but also the individual issues
that must be resolved as LO each class
member. Settlement can bypass these
problems too, at times by providing
alternative means of resolving individual
disputes under the cour~3aegis but
without making impossible demands on
the court.
Tlie decision to address (b)(3) settlement classes through a new paragraph
(b)(4) has already generated a modest
drafting controversy. Paragraph (b)(4)

would allow "certification under
subdivision (b)(3) for purposes of
settlement." Following drafting guidelines
created for the Standing Committee by
Bryan Garner, author of A Dictiol~atyof
Modem Legal Usage, "under" is used in
place of the familiar but ungainly
"pursuant to." The explicit intention of
the Advisory Committee is that a class
authorized by (b)(4) is a (b)(3) class.
As a (b)(3) class, it must satisfy all of the
prerequisites of subdivision (a) and also
must satisfy all of the (b)(3) requirements.
In addition, it carries the usual
consequences of all ib)(3) classes,
including the specific (b)(3) notice
requirements and the right to request
exclusion from the class. Many observers,
however, have supposed that the (bY.4)
class is a new entity, CUL adrift from
any of these requirements. This reaction
is cause at once for chagrin and
reconsideration. More words can be used
to convey the same thought. It will be
interesting to see whether [here is such
general concern that the drafting must
be revised.
This description of the changes
proposed for public comment leaves
aside other changes that were carefully
pursued to the final step before
recommending publication. Two deserve
specific comment.
Preliminary consideration of the merits
was one change that rose to win great
favor, met doubts, and then died. There is
great concern that class actions may be
brought on insubstantial claims, just one
step beyond the level that can win
precertification dismissal by motion for
failure to state a claim or for summary
judgment. Part way through the Advisory
Committee's deliberations, it was
suggested that the rule should be
amended to reject the Supreme Court
ruling that the merits of the claim must
not be considered in ruling on class
certification. Much comfort was drawn
from the imperfect analogy to the
tentative evaluation of the merits made ill

At the other end of the spectrum lie claims that promise to return only
minuscule recoveries to individual class members. A new factor (F)
would be added, permitting the court to consider "whether the
probable relief to individual class members justifies the costs and
burdens of class litigation." This provision has become known in the
vernacular as the "just ain't worth it" provision.
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mllng on preliminary injunctions.
Alternative drafts were prepared. One set
a low threshold, requiring only that the
class claims, issues, or defenses be "not
insubstantial on the merits." The other set
a higher threshold, invoking a balancing
process that weighed the prospect of class
success against the costs and burdens
imposed by certification. To the surprise
of a11 concerned, the defense lawyers who
initially championed this proposal had
second thoughts. Consideration of the
merits even in a tentative fashion would
justify substantial discovery on the merits
before the certification decision. Worse, a
finding that a sufficient showing had been
made could affect all subsequent events,
particularly the settlement process that
resolves most class actions just as it
resolves most other litigation. These
concerns were not assuaged by adding
the qualification that the merits need be
considered only at the request of a party
opposing class certification. Despite some
lingering regrets, this proposal was
abandoned.
The other near miss was part of the
"just ain't worth it" proposal. In addition
to consideration of the probable relief to
individual class members, interim drafts
provided for weighing the public interest
in class relief against the costs and
burdens of class litigation. This language
was meant to confirm the importance of
enforcing small claims that, in the
aggregate, represent significant public
enforcement values. In the end, however,
it was feared that explicit reference to the
public interest might seem to invite
judicial evaluation of the relative
importance of different substantive
policies. Different judges will assess
differently the benefits of enforcing any of
the many modem regulatory statutes.
Rather than encourage such substantive
distinctions, it was thought better to
assume an unvarying public interest in
enforcing any valid statutory or
commonlaw policy. This approach has
manifest attractions. At the same time, it
may encourage sweeping enforcement
against technical violations of ambiguous
enactments at the farthest reach of
'

meaning, committed by persons who
diligently sought to comply. Some will
regret the passing of this proposal.
Much activity will occur before any
final action on the Rule 23 proposals.
Much hard work will be done, most of it
by lawyers and judges who voluntarily
assume the burdens of responsible
participation in the public comment
process. All of the proposals that have
been advanced, and many of those that
have been put aside, will be carefully
reconsidered.
Evidence that the outcome of the Rule
23 proposals is not settled by the decision
to publish can be found in many earlier
experiences. Many proposals have been
advanced and then substantially changed,
deferred, or abandoned. Recent history
provides examples enough. In 1995, the
Committee published four proposals.
One was beyond controversy probably
because it affected a comer of
interlocutory admiralty appeal practice
that affects few litigants or l a y e r s . A
second seeks to restore the 12-member
civil jury; this proposal has been
recommended for approval by the
Standing Committee to the Judicial
Conference, but remains controversial
because 12-member juries cost more than
6-member juries. A third, advanced in
tandem with a parallel change in the
Criminal Rules, sought to ensure attorney
participation in voir dire examination of
prospective jurors. The comments and
hearings on this proposal showed a wide
difference between the perceptions of
lawyers and judges. La~vyersbelieve that
many judges conduct inadequate voir
dire examinations, while many judges
believe that l a y e r s will deliberately
subvert the process in search of adversary
advantage. The Advisory Committee
concluded that it would be unwise to
attempt reconciliation through present
n ~ l echanges. Instead, efforts will be
directed toward mutual education of
bench and bar in the hope that the
present rule can be made to work better.
A majority of federal judges now permit

direct lawyer voir dire examination, and
believe that it is effective so long as there is
unquestioned authority to terminate or
withhold the opportunity If more come to
permit lawyer participation, the present rule
may prove better than the proposed
alternative. Fourth and finally, a revised
proposal to amend the pro~lsionsfor
discovery protective orders was republished.
The comment process left the Ad\+m-y
Committee uncertain whether any change is
needed. More important, the Committee has
decided to turn its attention again to the
broader discovery questions that have been
on - or close to - the Committee agenda
without interruption for three decades.
Should significant changes be made in the
broad scheme of discoveer)! protective orders
may be affected in ways that cannot be
accommodated by present drafting.
Public comment taught much about these
recent proposals. It will teach much about
the current Rule 23 proposals. The broader
the base of participation, the better the
process nil1 work. No more able group of
commentators can be found than the readers
of Lnlv Quadrangle Notes. Your comments
should be addressed to Peter G. McCabe,
Secretary, Committee on Rules of Practice
and Procedure, Judicial Conference of the
United States, \Vashington. D.C. 20544.
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